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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  end  of  the  Cold  War  provides  the  United 
States  with  an  opportunity  to  cut  its  defense 
spending  significantly.  Indeed,  the  Bush  Administra- 
tion’s  1992-1997  Future  Years  Defense  Program 
(presented  in  1991  and  therefore  referred  to  as the 
“1991  plan”)  calls  for  a 20  percent  reduction  in real 
defense  spending  by  1997.  Although  expenditures 
related  to  Operation  Desert  Storm  have  delayed  the 
implementation  of the  199 1 plan,  policymakers  con- 
tinue  to call for defense  cutbacks.  In fact,  since  Bush’s 
plan  was  drafted  prior  to  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  it seems  likely  that  the  Clinton  Administra- 
tion  will propose  cuts  in  defense  spending  that  are 
even  deeper  than  those  specified  by  the  1991  plan. 
This  paper  draws  on  both  theoretical  and  empirical 
economic  models  to  forecast  the  effects  that  these 
cuts  will  have  on  the  U.S.  economy. 
A.  Economic  Theory 
Economic  theory  suggests  that  in  the  short  run, 
cuts  in  defense  spending  are  likely  to  have  disrup- 
tive  effects  on  the  U.S.  economy.  Productive 
resources-both  labor  and  capital-must  shift  out  of 
defense-related  industries  and  into  nondefense  in- 
dustries.  The  adjustment  costs  that  this  shift  entails 
are  likely  to restrain  economic  growth  as the  defense 
cuts  are  implemented. 
Economic  theory  is less  clear,  however,  about  the 
likely  long-run  consequences  of  reduced  defense 
spending.  The  neoclassical  macroeconomic  model 
(a  simple  version  of  which  is  presented  by  Barro, 
1984)  assumes  that  all goods  and  services  are  pro- 
duced  by  the  private  sector.  Rather  than  hiring labor, 
accumulating  capital,  and producing  defense  services 
itself,  the  government  simply  purchases  these  ser- 
vices  from  the  private  sector.  Thus,  according  to the 
neoclassical  model,  the  direct  effect  of a permanent 
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$1  cut  in defense  spending  acts  to decrease  the  total 
demand  for goods  and  services  in each  period  by  $1. 
Of  course,  so long  as the  government  has  access  to 
the  same  production  technologies  that  are  available 
to  the  private  sector,  this  prediction  of  the 
neoclassical  model  does  not  change  if  instead  the 
government  produces  the  defense  services  itself.’ 
A  permanent  $1  cut  in  defense  spending  also 
reduces  the  government’s  need  for  tax  revenue;  it 
implies  that  taxes  can  be  cut  by  $1  in each  period. 
Households,  therefore,  are  wealthier  following  the 
cut  in defense  spending;  their  permanent  income  in- 
creases  by  $b  1. According  to  the  permanent  income 
hypothesis,  this  $1  increase  in  permanent  income 
induces  households  to  increase  their  consumption  by 
$1  in every  period,  provided  that  their  labor  supply 
does  not  change. 
However,  the  wealth  effect  of  reduced  defense 
spending  may  also induce  households  to increase  the 
amount  of  leisure  that  they  choose  to  enjoy.  If 
households  respond  to  the  increase  in  wealth  by 
taking  more  leisure,  then  the  increase  in  consump- 
tion  from  the  wealth  effect  only  amounts  to  $( 1 -a) 
per  period,  where  cy is a number  between  zero  and 
one:  That  is, the  increase  in wealth  is split  between 
an increase  in consumption  and an increase  in leisure. 
In  general,  therefore,  the  wealth  effect  of  a  cut  in 
defense  spending  acts  to  increase  private  consump- 
tion,  and hence  total  demand,  by $( 1 -a)  per  period. 
The  increase  in  leisure  from  the  wealth  effect, 
meanwhile,  translates  into  a  decrease  in  labor 
supply.  This  decrease  in  labor  supply,  in  turn, 
translates  into  a decrease  in the  total  supply  of goods 
and  services.  In  fact,  the  increase  in  leisure  acts  to 
decrease  the  total  supply  of goods  by  $a  per  period 
(Barro,  1984,  Ch.  13). Thus,  the  number  o! measures 
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the  magnitude  of the  wealth  effect’s impact  on leisure 
and the  supply  of goods  relative  to itsimpact  on con- 
sumption  and  the  demand  for goods.  The  higher  a 
is, the  larger  the  decrease  in supply  and  the  smaller 
the  increase  in  demand.  \  _ 
Combining  the  direct  effect  of  the  permanent 
$1  cut  in  defense  spending,  which  decreases  total 
demand  by  $1  per  period,  with  the  wealth  effect, 
which  increases  total  demand  by $( 1 -  4  per ‘period, 
shows  that  the  permanent  cut  in  defense  spending 
decreases  the  total  demand  for  goods  by  $a  per 
period.  Likewise,  the  direct  effect  implies  no change 
in supply,  while  the  wealth  effect  implies  a decrease 
in supply  of $cr per  period;  when  combined,  the  two 
effects  imply  a decrease  in supply  of $(Y  per  period. 
Altogether,  both  total  demand  and  total  supply 
decrease  by  $cy in  each  period,  so  that  the  perma- 
nent  cut  in defense  spending  reduces  realoutput  by 
$a  in  each  period. 
Before moving  on, it is important  to emphasize  that 
although  the  neoclassical  model  predicts  that  total 
output  (GNP)  will  fall in  response  to  a permanent 
cut. in defense  spending,  this  result  does  not  imply 
that  households  would  be  better.  off  without  the 
spending  cut.  While  the permanent  $1 cut in defense 
spending  reduces  total  GNP  by $a  per  period,,it  also 
makes  available  to  households  $1  per  period  that 
would  otherwise  be  allocated  to  defense.  Private 
GNP,  defined  as  total  GNP  less  all  government 
spending,  therefore  increases  by $( 1 - ~4 per  period. 
Since  private  GNP.accounts  for  the  goods  and  ser- 
vices  that  are  available  to  the  private  sector,  it  is a 
better  measure  of welfare  than  total  GNP;  the  rise 
in private  GNP  indicates  that  households  are  better 
off after  the  defense  cuts,  even  though  total  GNP 
is  lower.  In  fact,  the  increase  in  private  GNP 
underestimates  the welfare gain from reduced  defense 
spending  since  it does  not ,take  into  account  the  in- 
crease  in leisure  resulting  from  the  wealth  effect  of 
the  spending  cut. 
So  far,  the  a  na ysis  1  has  assumed  that  the  cut  in 
defense  spending  will  be  used  to  reduce  taxes. 
Provided  that  the  Ricardian  equivalence  theorem 
applies,  however,  the  results  do not  change  if instead 
the  cuts  are  used  to  reduce  the  government  debt. 
Suppose  that,  in  fact,  the  permanent  $1  cut  in 
defense  spending  is  initially  used  to  reduce  the 
government  debt.  According  to  the  Ricardian 
equivalence  theorem,  households  recognize  that  by 
reducing  its debt,  the government  is reducing  its need 
for  future  tax  revenues  by  an  equal  amount.  Thus, 
using  the  cut  in  defense  spending  to  reduce  the 
government  debt  today  simply  means  that  tax’cuts 
of more  than  $1  per  period  will come  in the  future. 
Under  Ricardian  equivalence,  household  wealth  does 
not  depend  on the precise  timing  of the  tax cuts.  The 
magnitude  of  the  wealth  effect,  and  hence  the 
changes  in  aggregate  supply  and  demand,  are  the. 
same  whether  the  cut  in  defense  spending  is  used 
to  reduce  the  federal  debt  or  to  reduce  taxes. 
Central  to  the  Ricardian  equivalence  theorem  is 
the  assumption  that  households  experience  the  same 
change  in  wealth  from  a  reduction  in  government 
debt  as they  do  from  a cut  in taxes.  If this  assump- 
tion  is incorrect,  then  a cut  in defense  spending  can 
have  very  different  long-run  effects  from  those 
predicted  by the  neoclassical  model  under  Ricardian 
equivalence. 
Most  frequently,  the  relevance  of  the  Ricardian 
equivalence  theorem  is questioned  based  upon  the 
observation  that  households  have  lifetimes  of finite 
length  (Bernheim,  1987).  Suppose,  for instance,  that 
while individuals  recognize  that  a reduction  in govern- 
ment  debt  today  implies  that  taxes  will be  lower  in 
the  future,  they  also  expect  that  the  future  tax  cuts 
will occur  after  they  have  died.  In this  extreme  case, 
individuals  who  are alive today  experience  no change 
in  wealth  if,the  cuts  in  defense  spending  are  used 
to  reduce  the  government  debt.  Only  the  direct 
effect  of  the  defense  cut  is  present;  the  wealth 
effect  is missing.  Since  households  do not experience 
an increase  in permanent  income,  neither  their  con- 
sumption  nor  their  labor  supply  changes.  The 
decrease  in  total  demand  resulting  from  the  direct 
effect  of  the  spending  cut  leads  to  a  condition  of 
excess  supply. 
In  response  to  excess  supply,  output  falls  in  the 
short  run,  and  the  real  interest  rate  falls as well.  In 
the  long  run,  however,  the  lower  real  interest  rate 
leads  to  increases  in  both  investment  and  output. 
Thus,  a departure  from  Ricardian  equivalence  can 
explain  why  cuts  in defense  spending  might  increase, 
rather  than  decrease,  total  GNP  in  the  long  run, 
provided  that  the  cuts  are used  to reduce  the  govern- 
ment  debt. 
Whether  or not  the  Ricardian  equivalence  theorem 
applies  to the  U.S.  economy  is a controversial  issue. 
There  are  many  theoretical  models  in which  house- 
hold  wealth  is affected  by  a decrease  in government 
debt  in exactly  the  same  way  that  wealth  is affected 
by a decrease  in taxes,  so that  Ricardian  equivalence 
applies  (see  Barre,  1989,  for  a  survey  of  these 
models).  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  many  other 
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government  debt  differs from  the  wealth  effect  from 
a cut in taxes,  so that  Ricardian  equivalence  does  not 
hold  (see  Bernheim,  1987,  for  a  survey  of  these 
models).  Overall,  economic  theory  provides  no clear 
answer  as to the  relevance  of the  Ricardian  equiva- 
lence  theorem.  Consequently,  economic  theory  does 
not  provide  a clear  answer  as to the  long-run  effects 
of cuts  in defense  spending  either.  Instead,  empirical 
models  must  be  used  to  forecast  the  effects  of  re- 
duced  defense  spending. 
B.  Previous Empirical Estimates 
A  detailed  study  by  the  Congressional  Budget 
Office  (CBO,  1992)  forecasts  the  effects  of the  199 1 
plan  for the  U.S.  economy.  The  CBO’s  conclusions 
are  based  on  results  from  two  large-scale  macro- 
economic  forecasting  models:  the  Data  Resources, 
Inc.  (DRI)  Quarterly  Macroeconomic  Model  and the 
McKibbin-Sachs  Global  (MSG)  Model.  Both of these 
econometric  models  incorporate  short-run  djustment 
costs  of changes  in  defense  spending  and  long-run 
non-Ricardian  effects  of changes  in the  government 
debt  into  their  forecasts  for  real  economic  activity. 
The  models  predict,  therefore,  that  the cuts proposed 
by  the  1991  plan  will  reduce  growth  in  the  U.S. 
economy  in the  short  run.  The  models  also  predict 
that  if the  cuts in defense  spending  are used  to reduce 
the  federal  debt,  then  the  real  interest  rate  will fall 
and  investment  and  output  will increase  in the  long 
run  as the  non-Ricardian  effects  kick  in. Thus,  while 
the  CBO  predicts  that  the  199 1 plan will reduce  total 
GNP  by  approximately  0.6  percent  throughout  the 
mid-1990s  their  forecasts  also show  positive  effects 
on  total  GNP  by  the  end  of the  decade,  leading  to 
a long-run  increase  in total  GNP  of almost  1 percent. 
The  Congressional  Budget  Office’s  econometric 
models  draw  heavily  on  economic  theory  to  obtain 
their  conclusions.  As  noted  above,  however,  there 
is  considerable  debate  in  the  theoretical  literature 
concerning  the  possible  channels  through  which 
defense  spending  influences  aggregate  activity  in the 
long  run.  Models  that  assume  that  the  Ricardian 
equivalence  theorem  holds  indicate  that  cuts  in 
defense  spending  will reduce  output  in the  long  run. 
On  the  other  hand,  models  in  which  Ricardian 
equivalence  does  not  apply  predict  that  defense  cuts 
may  increase  output  in the  long  run,  provided  that 
the  proceeds  from  the  cuts  are  used  to  reduce  the 
government  debt.  The  CBO’s  models  both  assume 
that  Ricardian  equivalence  does  not  hold  in the  U.S. 
economy.  Hence,  their  forecasts  show  significant 
long-run  gains  in total  GNP  from  the  199 1 plan.  But 
these  forecasts  will be  on  target  only  to  the  extent 
that  their  underlying-and  controversial-assumption 
about  Ricardian  equivalence  is correct. 
C.  An  Alternative  Forecasting Strategy 
This  paper  takes  an  approach  to  forecasting  the 
effects  of  reduced  defense  spending  that  differs 
significantly  from  the  approach  taken  by  the  CBO. 
Rather  than  using  a large-scale  econometric  model, 
it uses  a much  smaller  vector  autoregressive  (VAR) 
model  like those  developed  by Sims (Jan.  1980,  May 
1980).  As  emphasized  by  Sims  (Jan.  1980),  VAR 
models  require  none  of  the  strong  theoretical 
assumptions  that  the  DRI  and MSG  models  rely  on 
so  heavily.  The  approach  taken  here,  therefore, 
recognizes  that  economic  theory  provides  no  clear 
answer  as  to  the  likely  long-run  effects  of  reduced 
defense  spending.  Moreover,  as  documented  by 
Lupoletti  and  Webb  (1986),  VAR  models  typically 
perform  as well  as the  larger  models  when  used  as 
forecasting  tools,  especially  over long horizons.  Thus, 
there  are  both  theoretical  and  practical  reasons  to 
prefer  the  VAR  approach  to  the  CBO’s. 
Forecasts  from  the  VAR  model,  like  those  from 
the  CBO’s  models,  show  that  the  199 1 plan will lead 
to  weakness  in  aggregate  output  in  the  short  run. 
Unlike  the  CBO’s  models,  however,  the  VAR  does 
not  predict  that  there  will be  a long-run  increase  in 
total  GNP  resulting  from  the  cuts  in defense  spend- 
ing,  even  if the  cuts  are  used  to  reduce  the  federal 
debt.  This  result,  which  is consistent  with  the  neo- 
classical model  under  Ricardian  equivalence,  suggests 
that  the  larger  models  rely  on the  incorrect  assump- 
tion  that  there  are  strong  non-Ricardian  effects  of 
changes  in  the  government  debt  in  the  U.S. 
economy. 
Although  the  VAR  forecasts  for  total  GNP  are 
considerably  more  pessimistic  than  the  CBO’s  fore- 
casts,  they  do not  imply  that  the  defense  cuts  called 
for by  the  199 1 plan  are  undesirable.  Private  GNP, 
in contrast  to  total  GNP,  is forecast  by  the  VAR  to 
increase  in the  long  run  as a result  of the  199 1 plan. 
This  result,  which  is again  consistent  with  the  neo- 
classical model  under  Ricardian  equivalence,  indicates 
that  the  199 1 plan will make  more  resources  available 
to  the  private  sector  in  the  long  run.  As  noted  by 
Garfinkel  (1990)  and  Wynne  (1991),  this  gain  in 
resources  can  be  used  to  increase  private  consump- 
tion  and  investment,  making  American  households 
better  off in  the  long  run. 
The  VAR  is introduced  in the  next  section.  Sec- 
tion  III presents  the  forecasts  generated  by the  VAR 
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CBO.  Section  IV  summarizes  and  concludes. 
II.  DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
The  basic model  is an extension  of the four-variable 
VAR  developed  by  Sims  (May  1980)  and  is  de- 
signed  specifically  to  capture  the  effects  of defense 
spending  on aggregate  economic  activity.  There  are 
six  variables  in  the  model:  the  growth  rate  of  real 
defense  spending  (RDEF),  the  growth  rate  of real 
U.S.  government  debt.(RDEBT),  the  nominal  six- 
month  commercial  paper  rate  (R),  the  growth  rate 
of the  broad  monetary  aggregate  (MZ),  the  growth 
rate  of the  implicit  price  deflator  for total  GNP  (P), 
and  the  growth  rate  of real total  GNP  (Y). All of the 
variables  except  for  the  interest  rate  are  expressed 
as growth  rates  so that  all may  be  represented  as sta- 
tionary  stochastic  processes.  Using  growth  rates  for 
these  variables  avoids  the  problems,  discussed  by 
Stock  and  Watson  (1989),  associated  with  including 
nonstationary  variables  in  the  VAR. 
Using  vector  notation,  the  model  can be written  as 
Xt =  ;:  B,Xt-,  +ut,  (1) 
s=l 
where  the  6x1  vector  Xt  is  given  by 
Xt = [RDEFt,RDEBT,,R,,MZ,,Pt,Ytj  ’  (2) 
and  where  the  B,  are  each  6x6  matrices  of  regres- 
sion coefficients.  In order  to obtain  information  about 
the  long-run  effects  of changes  in defense  spending, 
the  system  (1)  is  estimated  using  a  long  data  set 
that  extends  from  193 1 through  199 1. All data  are 
annual  (quarterly  data  are  unavailable  for dates  prior 
to  World  War  II);  their  sources  are  given  in  the 
appendix.  The  lag length  k = 4 is chosen  on the  basis 
of  the  specification  test  recommended  by  Doan 
(1989). 
Once  the  system  (1) is estimated,  impulse  response 
functions  can  be  used  to  trace  out  the  effects  of 
changes  in  defense  spending  and  the  government 
debt  on total  GNP  and,  in particular,  to forecast  the 
effects  of the  199 1 plan.  For  the  purpose  of gener- 
ating  impulse  response  functions,  the  ordering  of 
variables  shown  in equation  (2) reflects  the  assump- 
tion  that  policy  decisions  that  change  defense 
spending  are  made  before  the  contemporaneous 
values  of the  other  variables  are observed.  Monetary 
policy  actions,  which  are  best  captured  as  changes 
in  Rt  (McCallum,  1986),  are  made  after  decisions 
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that  affect  defense  spending  and  the  government 
debt,  but  before  money,  prices,  or  output  are  ob- 
served.  Money,  prices,  and  output  are  then  deter- 
mined  in  succession,  given  that  fiscal  policy  has 
determined  RDEF  and RDEBT  and monetary  policy 
has  determined  R.2 
III.  FORECASTSFROMTHE  VAR 
The  VAR  results  are  foreshadowed  in  Figure  1, 
which  plots  the  series  Y, RDEF,  and  RDEBT  over 
the  60-year  sample  period.  Panel  B reveals  that  there 
were  significant  cuts  in defense  spending  following 
World  War II, the  Korean  War,  and the Vietnam  War. 
In each  case,  the  defense  cuts  were  accompanied  by 
slow  growth  in total  GNP  (panel  A).  In light  of this 
past  relationship,  it seems  likely  that  the  VAR  will 
associate  the  defense  cuts  called  for by the  199 1 plan 
with  slower  total  GNP  growth,  at least  in the  short 
run. 
By comparing  the  behavior  of RDEBT  (panel  C) 
to  that  of Y (panel  A),  however,  it is difficult  to  see 
the  negative  long-run  relationship  between  output  and 
government  debt  predicted  by  models  in which  the 
Ricardian  equivalence  theorem  does  not  apply. 
Growth  in the  real  value  of  U.S.  government  debt 
was  negative  for  much  of the  1950s  and  1960s  and 
positive  for much  of the  1970s  and  all of the  1980s. 
2 More  formally,  the  variables  in equation  (2)  are  organized  as 
a Wold  causal  chain  to produce  the  impulse  response  functions. 
See  Sims  (1986)  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  Wold  causal 
chain  approach  as well as other  strategies  for identifying  impulse 
response  functions  in  VAR  models. 
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Figure  1B 
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was  substantially  different  before  and  after  1970,  as 
these  models  predict.  Thus,  it seems  likely  that  the 
VAR  will  not  find  strong  non-Ricardian  effects  of 
changes  in government  debt  in the  U.S.  economy. 
Figure  2,  panel  A,  shows  the  cumulative  impulse 
response  function  of Y to  a one-time  one-standard 
deviation  (20 percent)  decrease  in RDEF,  computed 
using  the  VAR  described  by  equations  (1) and  (‘Z).3 
The  graph  shows  the  cumulative  change  in the  level 
of total GNP  through  the  end  of each year that  results 
from a decrease  in RDEF  in the first year.  It indicates 
that  the  decrease  in RDEF  yields a contemporaneous 
decrease  in total  GNP  of approximately  1.5 percent. 
The  effect  of the  shock  to  RDEF  peaks  at 5.5  per- 
cent  after  four  years  before  settling  down  to  a long- 
run  decrease  of about  2.5  percent.  The  confidence 
interval  reveals  that  the  initial decrease  in total  GNP 
due  to the  decrease  in defense  spending  is statistically 
significant.  In  fact,  the  hypothesis  that  changes  in 
RDEF  do  not  influence  Y (more  formally,  the  hy- 
pothesis  that  changes  in RDEF  do not Granger-cause 
changes  in  Y)  can  be  rejected  at  the  99  percent 
confidence  level.4  Thus,  the  model  indicates  that 
in response  to  a decrease  in defense  spending,  total 
GNP  will fall in both  the  short  run  and  the  long  run. 
Figure  2,  panel  B,  plots  the  cumulative  impulse 
response  function  of Y to  a one-time  one-standard 
deviation  (3  percent)  decrease  in  RDEBT.  Con- 
sistent  with  the  non-Ricardian  assumptions  that  are 
embedded  in  the  DRI  and  MSG  models,  this  im- 
pulse  response  function  indicates  that  a decrease  in 
RDEBT  will increase  total  GNP  in the  long  run.  In 
addition,  the  hypothesis  that  changes  in RDEBT  do 
not  influence  changes  in  Y  can  be  rejected  at  the 
98  percent  confidence  level.  However,  at  no  time 
are  the  effects  of RDEBT  on  Y very  large;  except 
in period  2,  the  confidence  interval  always  includes 
zero.  Overall,  therefore,  Figure  2 is consistent  with 
the  neoclassical  model  under  Ricardian  equivalence, 
which  predicts  that  a  reduction  in  the  size  of  the 
federal  debt  will  not  have  a  large  effect  on  output 
and  that  a reduction  in defense  spending  will perma- 
nently  reduce  total  GNP. 
3 Note  that  each  of the  impulse  response  functions  in  Figure  2 
traces  out  the  effects  of a decrease  in  one  of  the  variables  on 
GNP.  Impulse  response  functions  more  typically  examine  the 
effects  of  an  increase  in  one  of  the  model’s  variables.  Here, 
however,  it is the  effects  of decreases  in defense  spending  and 
government  debt  that  are  of  interest,  so  the  direction  of  the 
shock  is  reversed. 
4 Here  and  below,  the  likelihood  ratio  test  for block  exogeneity 
described  by  Doan  (1989)  is  used  to  test  for  the  absence  of 
Granger  causality. 
Figure  2A 
CUMULATIVE  RESPONSE  OF  GROWTH  RATE  OF 
REAL  GNP  TO  GROWTH  RATE  OF 
REAL  DEFENSE  SPENDING 
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Forecasts  from  the  VAR  are  generated  by  con- 
straining  future  values  of  RDEF  and  RDEBT  as 
called  for by the  199 1 plan.  The  constrained  values 
of  RDEF  and  RDEBT  translate  into  constrained 
values  of the  shocks  to these  two  variables.  Hence, 
the  VAR  forecasts  are essentially  linear  combinations 
of the  impulse  response  functions  shown  in  Figure 
‘2. The  impulse  response  functions  suggest  that  the 
short-run  forecasts  from  the  VAR  will be  similar  to 
those  given  by  the  CBO’s  models,  but  the  long-run 
forecasts  will  be  quite  different.  All  of  the  models 
Figure 2B 
CUMULATIVE  RESPONSE  OF  GROWTH  RATE  OF 
REAL  GNP  TO  GROWTH  RATE  OF 
REAL  GOVERNMENT  DEBT 









-2  -  \ 
\ 
-3  -  \  -/------- 
-4  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’ 
i  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14’15 
8  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1992 predict  that  cuts  in defense  spending  will reduce  total 
GNP  in the  short  run.  But  the  VAR  forecasts  none 
of the  long-run  gains  in total  GNP  that  the  large-scale 
models  do. 
The  table  (right)  compares  the  forecasts  of  the 
effects  of the  199 1 plan  on total  GNP  generated  by 
the  VAR  model  to those  generated  by the  DRI  and 
MSG  models.  All three  sets  of forecasts  compare  the 
predicted  behavior  of total  GNP  under  a base  case, 
in which  real defense  spending  is essentially  held con- 
stant  as a fraction  of total  GNP  (except  for the  small 
decreases  called for by the  Budget  Enforcement  Act), 
to  the  behavior  of total  GNP  when  defense  spend- 
ing  is  cut  as  called  for  by  the  1991  plan  and  the 
proceeds  are  used  to  reduce  the  federal  debt.  The 
figures  in  the  table  represent  the  predicted  differ- 
ences,  in percentages,  between  the level of total GNP 
under  the  1991  plan  and  the  level  of total  GNP  in 
the  base  case.  Details  about  these  two  alternative 
paths  for defense  spending  are provided  in the CBO’s 
report  (1992,  Table  3,  p.  lo),  as  are  the  forecasts 
from  the  DRI  and MSG  models  (Figure  3, p.  14 and 
Table  4,  p.  15). 
The  table  shows  that  the VAR model  is consistent- 
ly  more  pessimistic  than  the  CBO’s  models  about 
both  the  short-run  and  long-run  effects  of the  1991 
plan.  While  the  DRI  and  MSG  models  predict  that 
the  short-run  costs  of reduced  defense  spending  will 
be  0.5  to  0.7  percent  of  total  GNP,  the  VAR 
estimates  these  costs  at  1 to  1.8  percent  of  total 
GNP.  While  the  DRI  and MSG  models  expect  long- 
run  benefits  from  the  debt  reduction  to  begin  off- 
setting  the  short-run  costs  in the  mid-1990s  the VAR 
predicts  that  the  costs  of the  1991  plan  will peak  at 
2.4  percent  of total  GNP  in the  late  1990s.  Finally, 
while  both  the  DRI  and  MSG  models  predict  gains 
in  total  GNP  by  the  year  2000,  the  VAR  model 
predicts  that  there  will be  a permanent  loss  of  1.9 
percent  of  total  GNP  from  the  1991  plan. 
In  order  to  check  the  robustness  of  the  VAR 
forecasts,  several  kinds  of alternative  model  specifica- 
tions  can  be  considered.  Although  the  causal  order- 
ing used  in equation  (2) is to  be  preferred  based  on 
economic  theory,  it would  be  troublesome  if other 
orderings  yielded  vastly  different  results.  Similar 
forecasts  are  obtained,  however,  when  RDEF  and 
RDEBT  are placed  last, rather  than  first, in the order- 
ing. The  model  does  not  include  some  variables  that 
may  nonetheless  be  useful  in  forecasting  GNP 
growth.  Following  the  suggestion  of Dotsey  and Reid 
(1992),  an oil price  series  can be added  to the  model, 
but  again  the  results  do  not  change.  Nor  do  the 
Forecasts of the  Effects  of the  1991 Plan  on GNP 
Model 
DRI  MSG  VAR  VAR 
Year  (total  GNP)  (total  GNP)  (total  GNP)  (private  GNP) 
1992  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2 
1993  -0.7  -0.6  -  1.0  -0.3 
1994  -0.6  -0.5  -1.4  -0.5 
1995  -0.6  -0.5  -1.8  -0.4 
1996  -0.6  -0.3  -2.2  -0.4 
1997  -0.6  -0.2  -2.4  -0.3 
2000  0.0  0.5  -2.0  -0.1 
2010  N/A  0.8  -  1.9  0.3 
2015  N/A  0.9  -  1.9  0.3 
Notes:  The  effects  are  expressed  as  percentage  differences  between  GNP 
under  the  1991  plan  for  reductions  in  defense  spending  and 
GNP  under  the  base  case  of  no  change  in  real  defense  spending. 
DRI  is  the  Data  Resouces  Model,  MSG  is  the  McKibbin-Sachs 
Model,  and  VAR  is the  vector  autoregressive  model.  Details  about 
the  two  alternative  paths  for  defense  spending,  as  well  as  the 
forecasts  from  the  DRI  and  MSG  models,  are  taken  from  CBO 
(1992).  N/A  indicates  that  the  forecast  is  not  available. 
results  change  if nondefense  government  spending 
or  Barro  and  Sahasakul’s  (1986)  marginal  tax  rate 
series  is added  as  a  seventh  variable.  Since  Figure 
1 reveals  that  the  behavior  of the  model’s  variables 
was  most  dramatic  during  and  shortly  after  World 
War  II,  it is useful  to  know  the  extent  to which  the 
results  depend  on  the  data  from  these  years.  When 
the  six-variable  VAR  is  reestimated  with  quarterly 
data  from  1947  through  199 1, the  1991  plan  is pre- 
dicted  to  reduce  total  GNP  in the  long  run  by  2.7 
percent,  a  figure  that  is  even  larger  than  that 
generated  by the  original model.  Finally,  the forecasts 
are insensitive  to changes  in the  lag length  from  k = 4 
to k = 3,  5,  or 6.  The  VAR  forecasts,  therefore,  are 
quite  robust  to changes  in model  specification;  in all 
cases,  cuts  in  defense  spending  are  predicted  to 
reduce  total  GNP  substantially  in the  long  run,  even 
when  cuts  are  used  to  reduce  the  federal  debt. 
To  emphasize  the  point  that  the  VAR  forecasts, 
although  considerably  more  pessimistic  than  the 
CBO’s  forecasts,  do  not  imply  that  the  defense  cuts 
called  for by the  199 1 plan  are undesirable,  the  table 
also  presents  forecasts  from  a  VAR  model  that  is 
identical  to  model  (l),  except  that  the  growth  rate 
of total  GNP  is replaced  by the growth  rate  of private 
GNP.  Private  GNP,  like total  GNP,  is predicted  to 
fall in the  short  run as the  199 1 plan is implemented. 
In the  long  run,  however,  private  GNP  is expected 
to  increase  by  0.3  percent.  The  1991  plan  reduces 
total  GNP,  but  it also makes  available  to the  private 
sector  resources  that  would  otherwise  be  allocated 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  9 to  defense.  The  VAR  forecasts  show  that  on  net, 
private  GNP  increases,  making  American  households 
better  off from  the  1991  plan  in  the  long  run. 
IV.  SUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONS 
The  Bush  Administration’s  1992-1997  Future 
Years  Defense  Program  (the  “1991  plan”)  calls  for 
the  first  significant  cuts  in  defense  spending  in  the 
United  States  since  the  end  of  the  Vietnam  War. 
Economic  theory  indicates  that  these  defense  cuts 
are  likely  to  restrain  economic  growth  in the  short 
run  as  productive  resources  shift  out  of  defense- 
related  activities  and  into  nondefense  industries. 
Economic  theory  is less  clear,  however,  about  the 
long-run  consequences  of reduced  defense  spending. 
Models  that  assume  that  the  Ricardian  equivalence 
theorem  holds  find  that  a  permanent  decrease  in 
defense  spending  decreases  aggregate  output  in the 
long  run.  On  the  other  hand,  models  that  assume 
that  Ricardian  equivalence  does  not  apply predict  that 
a permanent  decrease  in defense  spending  increases 
output  in the  long  run,  provided  that  the  proceeds 
from  the  spending  cut are  used  to reduce  the  federal 
debt. 
The  large-scale  econometric  models  employed  by 
the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (1992)  rely  on the 
theoretical  assumption  that  Ricardian  equivalence 
does  not hold in the  U.S.  economy.  Thus,  the CBO’s 
models  predict  that  while  the  1991  plan  will reduce 
total  GNP  in the  short  run  as the  economy  adjusts 
to a lower  level of defense  spending,  they  also predict 
that  the  non-Ricardian  effects  of reducing  the govern- 
ment  debt  will generate  an increase  in total  GNP  in 
the  long  run. 
As an alternative  to the  CBO’s  large-scale  models, 
this paper  uses  a much  smaller VAR model  to forecast 
the  macroeconomic  effects  of the  199 1 plan.  Unlike 
the  larger  models,  the  VAR  requires  no  strong 
theoretical  assumption  about  whether  or not  Ricar- 
dian  equivalence  holds  in  the  U.S.  economy.  The 
VAR,  therefore,  recognizes  that  economic  theory 
provides  no  clear  answer  as  to  the  likely  long-run 
effects  of  reduced  defense  spending. 
In  fact,  results  from  the  VAR  suggest  that  the 
Ricardian  equivalence  theorem  does  apply  to  the 
U.S.  economy.  Changes  in  government  debt  are 
found  to  have  only  small  effects  on  aggregate 
output.  Forecasts  from  the  VAR,  which  show  that 
the  1991  plan  is likely  to  reduce  total  GNP  in both 
the  short  run  and  long  run,  are more  consistent  with 
the  neoclassical  model  presented  by  Barro  (1984), 
in which  Ricardian  equivalence  holds,  than with those 
of competing  models  in which  Ricardian  equivalence 
does  not  apply. 
Although  the  VAR forecasts  are considerably  more 
pessimistic  than  the  CBO’s  forecasts,  they  do  not 
imply  that  the  defense  cuts  called  for  by  the  1991 
plan  are  undesirable.  In  fact,  both  the  neoclassical 
model  and the  VAR forecasts  suggest  that  as the  cuts 
in defense  spending  are implemented,  growth  in total 
GNP  is likely  to  be  a misleading  measure  of house- 
hold  welfare.  Although  the  1991  plan  reduces  total 
GNP,  it  also  makes  available  to  the  private  sector 
resources  that.  would  otherwise  be  allocated  to 
defense.  The  VAR forecasts  show that  on net,  private 
GNP  increases.  As  noted  by  Garfinkel  (1990)  and 
Wynne  (199 l),  this  net  gain  can be  used  to increase 
private  consumption  or private  investment,  making 
American  households  better  off in  the  long  run. 
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DATASOURCES 
Defense  Spending:  Data  for  1930  through  1938 
are  national  security  outlays  reported  in Table  A-I 
of  Kendrick  (1961).  Data  for  1939  to  1991  are 
government  purchases  of goods  and services,  national 
defense,  from  Table  3.7a  of  the  &rwey  of Carrent 
Business,  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis.  The  nominal  data  are  deflated 
using  the  implicit  price  deflator  for  GNP  reported 
in Table  7.4  of  the  same  publication. 
Government  Debt:  Debt  before  1941  is total  gross 
debt  at  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  reported  in  the 
Bzdl’etin  of the Treasury.  Debt  for  1941-1991  is total 
outstanding  debt,  also  at the  end  of the  fiscal  year, 
reported  in the  same  publication.  Nominal  debt  was 
deflated  to real terms  using  the  implicit  price  deflator 
for  GNP. 
Interest  Rate:  The  six-month  commercial  paper 
rate is taken  from Table  H 1.5  of the  Statkticai Reha.w, 
Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
Moneta  y  Aggregate:  The  money  supply  series 
before  1959  is the  M4  aggregate  reported  in Table 
1 of  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1970).  The  money 
series  for  19.59 to  1991  is  the  M’Z series  reported 
in Table  1.2 1 of the  Federal  Reserve  BaDetin,  Board 
of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
Price  Deflutor:  The  implicit price  deflator  for GNP 
is from  Table  7.4  of the  Sur~q  of  &rent  Business, 
Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis. 
Gross  National  Product:  Nominal  figures  for GNP 
are  taken  from  Table  1.1  of  the  Su~ey  of  Current 
Business,  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis.  Nominal  GNP  was  deflated  to 
real terms  using  the  implicit  price  deflator  for GNP. 
Nondefense  Government  Spending:  Nondefense 
spending  is  government  purchases  of  goods  and 
services  from  Table  1.1  of  The Nationa/  Income and 
Pmduct Accounts (Department  of Commerce,  Bureau 
of  Economic  Analysis),  less  the  defense  spending 
series  described  above. 
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